Beijing worried that large defaults could destabilize financial
system
An employee seals a stack of
yuan banknotes at a bank in Huaibei, Anhui province, China. © Reuters
ZHANG YUKUN and CHENG
SIWEI, CaixinMay 8, 2023 14:52 JST
Tackling the mountain of hidden debt
accumulated by China's local governments is, once again, at the top of the
political agenda as the economy gets back on track after a three-year pummeling
from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Concern
about the risks to the financial system and the sustainability of local
government finances from trillions of yuan of invisible liabilities has
stretched to the pinnacle of policymaking.
In
its meeting on the economy on April 28, the Politburo, China's top
decision-making body, called for strengthening local government debt management
and strictly controlling increases in hidden debt.
Xi
Jinping, China's president and head of the ruling Communist Party, highlighted
preventing and defusing local government debt risks in an article published in
February by Qiushi, the party's official journal. The article, titled "A
few major issues in current economic work," was taken from Xi's speech at
the annual Central Economic Work Conference in December, a key policymaking
meeting, which called for greater efforts to deal with outstanding hidden debt.
"It's
necessary to consolidate the responsibility of provincial-level governments to
prevent and resolve hidden debts, increase efforts to dispose of outstanding
hidden debts, optimize the maturity structure of debts, reduce the interest
burden, steadily promote the unified supervision of local government hidden
debt and on-the-books debt, and resolutely curb the increase of hidden
debt," Xi said, adding that the governance of local government financing
vehicles (LGFVs) should be strengthened "to help them transform."
Implicit guarantees
Xi's
exhortations and a string of statements and comments from Finance Minister Liu
Kun underscore the limited progress that has been made over the past decade to
contain the financial liabilities of local authorities that are not explicitly
reported in their official budgets.
The
State Council defined hidden debt in 2018, describing it as any borrowing that
is not part of on-budget government debt but carries an explicit or implicit
guarantee of repayment using fiscal funds or is backed by illegal guarantees.
It mainly includes bond issuance by LGFVs -- state-owned companies set up to
finance local government investment such as building infrastructure, including
highways and bridges. Debt is also hidden in public-private partnership
projects, shady loan contracts and other channels used by local governments to
raise money.
Under
pressure to meet growth and investment targets, local authorities use these
channels to raise money to pay for infrastructure and public welfare projects
that they cannot fund entirely through on-budget spending because of controls
on their official debt.
The
main holders of LGFV bonds include banks and insurance companies, and banks are
also major lenders to the vehicles. The government's concern is that any
large-scale defaults could have a destabilizing impact on the banking sector
and financial system.
There
is no publicly available official data on the current scale of hidden debt,
which was first revealed by the National Audit Office in a December 2013
report. The watchdog estimated that the total debt of local governments had
surged to 17.9 trillion yuan ($2.9 trillion) by June that year, and much of it
was hidden debt.
There
has been no public update on that figure but many analysts, including those at
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have come up with their own estimates,
which range from some 30 trillion yuan to more than 70 trillion yuan.
In
its latest Article IV consultation report on China, the IMF estimated that at
the end of 2022, explicit on-the-books debt of local governments, including
bonds, was 35 trillion yuan. But implicit debt likely amounted to double that
figure -- 70.4 trillion yuan, comprising 56.7 trillion yuan of LGFV debt that
was "possible to be recognized as general government debt" and 13.7
trillion yuan of debt tied to government-guided funds (GGFs) and special
construction funds (SCFs). In 2027, LGFV debt is forecast to almost double to
101.8 trillion yuan and GGF and SCF debt to rise to 22.8 trillion yuan.
Workers at a
Shanghai construction site in 2022. © Reuters
No responsibility
The
inclusion of LGFV liabilities that may need to be recognized as government
debt, and the GGF and SCF debt more than doubled China's overall government
debt-to-gross domestic product ratio in 2022 from 51% to 110%, the IMF
calculated.
China's
Ministry of Finance disputes the IMF's assessment of government debt, saying
that the amended Budget Law passed in 2014 made it clear that the liability for
LGFV debt lies with the entity that issued it. "Local governments do not
bear the responsibility to repay the debt of LGFVs and other state-owned
enterprises since the implementation of the amended Budget Law in 2014,
including the implicit debt illegally borrowed by LGFVs," the ministry
said in its response to the report.
The
ministry has repeatedly made it clear that local governments are responsible
for their own debts and that the central government will not come to their
rescue.
"If
it's your baby, you own it. There will be no bailout from the central
government," the ministry said in a letter dated August responding to a
proposal to deal with hidden debt submitted by a member of China's top
political advisory body.
Even
so, LGFV bonds have been popular among investors because they are deemed to
carry implicit guarantees that the local government backing them will step in
to make repayments should the vehicle default. Local governments go to great
lengths to prevent LGFV defaults, concerned that non-payment will sully their
own creditworthiness and make it more expensive for them to issue their own
bonds.
No
LGFV has failed to repay a bond so far, although there have been defaults on
non-standard debt, which usually refers to debt that is not traded on the
interbank market or stock exchanges such as trust loans, acceptance bills and
accounts receivable. From January 2018 to November 2021, more than 80 LGFVs in
Guizhou, one of China's most indebted provinces, defaulted on non-standard
debt, according to CSCI Pengyuan Credit Rating.
The
government's warnings leave local officials on their own to deal with tens of
trillions of yuan of on- and off-the books borrowings built up since the global
financial crisis to fund investment and help them meet GDP growth targets.
Guizhou,
one of China's poorest provinces, has been one of the most high-profile regions
trying to deal with both its official and hidden debt.
In
April, the provincial government signed an agreement with the State Council's
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, which said it
would encourage companies directly owned by the central government to
collaborate with Guizhou on areas including industrial development and reform
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
A few
days later, Guizhou signed an agreement with state-owned, bad-debt manager
China Cinda Asset Management to deepen collaboration on promoting high-quality
development. Cinda will set up a group of 50 financial experts to provide
advice and help to the province, and establish a "comprehensive services
mechanism" and specific programs, the Beijing-based company said in a
statement. The focus of the services will be on serving the real economy,
preventing and resolving risks, helping SOE reform, and shoring up the real
estate sector, it said.
In a
sign of how important tackling hidden debt has become, a growing number of
provincial- and city-level governments highlighted the issue as one of their
top priorities in their work reports to local legislatures earlier this year.
Information
compiled by Tan Yiming, a fixed-income analyst at Minsheng Securities, shows
that out of the Chinese mainland's 31 provincial-level regions, at least 18
included tasks related to hidden debt in their 2023 government or budget
reports, up from 10 in 2022.
These
reports rarely provide the nitty-gritty details of how the problem will be resolved,
although some give a general outline.
Jiangsu
province and Chongqing municipality have vowed to prevent new hidden debt by
strengthening oversight of LGFVs, while the governments of Gansu and Henan
provinces said they plan to set up evaluation mechanisms or improve
accountability management systems to keep hidden debt and debt risks in check.
Henan
and Guizhou are also among the provinces that pledged in their 2023 budget
reports to strictly inspect and punish illegal debt-raising and fraudulent debt
resolution.
More debt swaps
As the
central government looks for ways to clean up local government hidden debt,
speculation is growing that another debt swap program will be part of the
solution.
In an
interview with the state-run Xinhua News Agency published on Jan. 7, Guo
Shuqing, head of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, said
one of the measures to deal with risks in the financial sector will involve
allowing local governments to undertake debt swaps "in an orderly manner."
Some 4
trillion to 4.7 trillion yuan of local government hidden debt will need to be
swapped in 2023, Citic Securities analysts led by chief economist Ming Ming
estimated in a report published in February. The figures are based on the
estimation that 9.2 trillion to 10.8 trillion yuan of LGFV debt will need to be
repaid and swap bonds will be needed to deal with a chunk of it.
Some
local authorities have already said they plan to issue "swap bonds,"
where debt is exchanged for local government bonds to bring off-balance-sheet
borrowings onto their books.
Guizhou
is among the provinces proposing to swap its hidden debt with new government
bonds, according to the budget report presented to the provincial legislature
in January. The province's broader debt restructuring will be done in
coordination with financial institutions and it will seek extensions to
repayment periods and lower interest rates, the report said.
The
program has already started. In December, Zunyi Road and Bridge Construction
(Group), a financing vehicle in Guizhou, announced a debt restructuring
agreement with 21 banks that involved delaying repayment on 15.6 billion yuan
in borrowings by changing the term on all the loans to 20 years, and paying
only interest on the loans for the next 10 years.
Swap
bonds were first introduced in 2015 as part of a strategy to bring hidden debt
out of the shadows and improve transparency over the scale of local government
borrowings by bringing hidden liabilities into local budgets. Under a
three-year program that officially ended in 2018, local authorities were
allocated quotas to issue bonds whose proceeds could only be used to repay
off-the-books loans of LGFVs or other state-linked entities which local
governments could be liable for. Exchanging the old debt for government bonds
meant the liabilities were transferred onto the balance sheets of local
governments.
Under
the program, a total of 12.2 trillion yuan of swap bonds were issued, according
to the Citic Securities report.
The
swap bond program was extended in 2019 in a pilot that allowed selected, mostly
impoverished, county-level regions to deal with unresolved hidden debt through
collaboration with financial institutions. The amount of swap bonds issued in
2019 reached almost 160 billion yuan, according to a February report by GF
Securities.
In
what some called the third round of swap bond issuance, three affluent
provincial-level regions -- Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong -- issued what are
essentially swap bonds to clean up their hidden debt. These bonds showed up on
local balance sheets as refinancing bonds, new debt issued by local governments
usually to repay their on-budget maturing bonds. In this case, they have been
used for bringing hidden debt onto the books. Meanwhile, the county-level swap
pilot program has continued.
The
amount of de facto debt-swap bonds issued between late 2020 and mid-2022
amounted to 1.17 trillion yuan, the GF report said.
Guangdong
and Beijing have both announced the completion of their cleanups, although they
did not provide details of the scale of the debt or how it was dealt with.
No
provision for swap bonds was contained in the Ministry of Finance's 2023 budget
report to the National People's Congress in March. But the government could dip
into the existing unused quota for local government bonds, Li Qinghe, a fixed-income
analyst at Huafu Securities, wrote in a February report.
Other debt management measures
Some
local governments are exploring the establishment of a reserve fund
specifically to repay debt in accordance with State Council guidelines issued
in April 2021 related to deepening reform of the budget management system.
The
guidelines did not explicitly specify whether the reserve fund system should be
used for repaying hidden debt or on-budget debt.
No
official documents on how the system would work have been publicly released,
but a number of local governments, including Shanxi and Henan, have said in the
past two years that they are working on such a system. Hubei province in
central China said in 2022 that in general, a reserve fund should be no less than
5% of the outstanding balance of local government debt.
Tackling
hidden debt does not only involve local governments taking over off-the-books
liabilities and putting them onto their own balance sheets. It also involves
them acting as coordinators and facilitators of LGFV debt restructuring with
creditors, who are mainly banks and bond investors.
Guizhou
province has been the most high-profile example so far, but other provinces
have also said they are seeking help from financial institutions.
Liaoning,
a rust belt province in northeast China, said it would, through collaboration
with banks and companies, help cities and counties extend or restructure their
high-interest or maturing hidden debt to defuse financial risks.
--
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https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/China-s-local-governments-struggle-with-hidden-debt
This argument is similar …gangster saying! no responsibility
“The ministry has
repeatedly made it clear that local governments are responsible for their own
debts and that the central government will not come to their rescue.”
Local governments must obtain and consent from the central
government before loans, debts, etc.
Local governments cannot arbitrarily borrow money
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